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Students of human emotion typically assume the existence of categorical 
distinctions between emotions corresponding to the terms that refer to them. 
According to this commonsense view of the relations of names to things, 
emotion terms have referents that differ in kind from one another. This “dis-
continuity” assumption undergirds theories of basic or discrete emotions 
(e.g., Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1993; Roseman, 1991). At the same time, how-
ever, there are accounts of the emotions that invoke continuous dimensions 
underlying affective experience (e.g., Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 
1985). These accounts imply that the emotional domain is not partitioned 
into discrete natural kinds. If there are no joints at which the domain can be 
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carved, then any taxonomy must be somewhat artifi cial. Echoing these con-
cerns, recent work in the cognitive structure of emotion warns against any 
simple confl ation of emotion terms with the emotions themselves (Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988); distinct terms may have indistinct referents. In re-
sponse to these issues, the discreteness of emotions has begun to receive 
empirical attention (Etcoff & Magee, 1992; Haslam, 1995). 
The question of discreteness has recently been brought to the fore in 
discussions of envy and jealousy (Salovey, 1991). Parrott and Smith (1993) 
sought evidence for a “qualitative” distinction between the two emotions, 
following Salovey and Rodin’s (1986) failure to fi nd differences in the pro-
fi le of their affective features. In two studies, Parrott and Smith found that 
when affective intensity was statistically controlled, and when envy- and 
jealousy-related situational elements were factorially manipulated, many 
differences could indeed be found. These differences corresponded closely 
to the traditional envy/jealousy distinction, according to which the former 
is related to social comparison and the latter to romantic rivalry (Sabini & 
Silver, 1982; White, 1981): Feelings of inferiority, longing, and resentment 
were relatively more salient in envy, and feelings of distrust, anger, and 
fear of loss were more characteristic of jealousy. 
Although Parrott and Smith’s (1993) work demonstrated that the expe-
riences of envy and jealousy are distinguishable, with distinctive features 
that compose orthogonal components, this does not in itself show that they 
represent discrete categories. For example, neuroticism and extraversion 
are distinct, orthogonal personality dimensions, but there is no evidence 
that there are discrete categories of neurotics and extraverts (Eysenck, 
1967). Similarly, features of envy could covary independently of features 
of jealousy in emotion episodes marked by rivalry of some sort without 
there being bounded classes corresponding to two discrete emotions. In the 
same way that neurotic and extravert are used to refer to people who are 
relatively elevated on the continuous dimensions of neuroticism and ex-
traversion, respectively, envy and jealousy might simply refer to emotion 
episodes that are elevated to a somewhat arbitrary extent on their respec-
tive dimensions. If this were true, then episodes of envy and jealousy, be-
ing drawn from the high end of different dimensions, would indeed show 
reliable differences in experiential quality, even if no category boundaries 
exist. For two entities to be truly discrete, that is, they must not only have 
distinctive features, but also show further evidence that these features form 
categories. Consequently, Parrott and Smith’s fi ndings of qualitative differ-
ences cannot fully answer the question of whether the terms envy and jeal-
ousy have discrete, categorical referents. 
In order to show discreteness, then, an additional methodological and 
conceptual step must be taken. Having established that reliable differenc-
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es can be observed between two things, it remains to be determined wheth-
er these differences are latently matters of degree or matters of kind. To 
say that a difference is a matter of kind is to say that a latent discontinui-
ty underlies manifest variation. If neuroticism were a matter of kind, for 
example, then two latent classes—one of neurotics and one of non-neu-
rotics—would underlie manifest variation in it (i.e., scores on a neuroti-
cism scale). If, on the other hand, neuroticism were a matter of degree, 
then there would be only one latent class, whose members vary continu-
ously. As manifest variation may be continuous whether the latent situation 
is continuous or discontinuous, specialized methodologies are required to 
test between these alternatives. The present study attempted to perform 
such tests on the manifest differences between envy and jealousy demon-
strated by Parrott and Smith (1993). 
The existence of a latent discontinuity does not imply that meaningful 
variation is absent within each latent class or that there is no overlap be-
tween the two latent classes. Some men show more prototypically masculine 
traits than others, and some women show more such traits than some men, 
without there being any doubt that biological sex is discontinuous. Similar-
ly, if jealousy is discrete then some episodes of jealousy will be more in-
tense or more prototypically jealous than others, and some episodes of other 
emotions may well contain more features of jealousy than some episodes of 
jealousy. Nevertheless, discreteness would imply that jealousy is an affec-
tive kind to which emotion episodes categorically do or do not belong. 
Discreteness also has implications for claims about the cooccurrence of 
emotions. Cooccurrence implies a conjunction of discrete entities or attri-
butes which could occur separately or could both be absent. Neuroticism 
and extraversion, for instance, could not be said to cooccur in people un-
less there is a discrete class of people who are neurotic and an overlapping 
class of people who are extraverted. If neuroticism and extraversion are la-
tently continuous attributes, then all people have degrees of both and cooc-
currence would be meaningless. If envy and jealousy are not discrete, then 
emotion episodes could contain mixtures or blends of their respective fea-
tures, but not the combined presence of two distinct affective syndromes. 
If envy and jealousy are not discrete, then, it is not clear in what sense they 
can be said to cooccur, as Parrott and Smith (1993) have claimed. 
Arguments between discrete and dimensional accounts of latent variables 
are common in several domains of psychology (Meehl, 1992), and have im-
portant practical and ontological implications. However, statistical methods 
for adjudicating between them are only beginning to see widespread use, 
largely through the popularization of Meehl and Golden’s (1982) taxomet-
ric methods. To date there have been several taxometric investigations of 
psychopathological syndromes ( e.g., Golden & Meehl, 1979; Harris, Rice, 
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& Quinsey, 1994; Haslam & Beck, 1994; Lenzenweger & Korfi ne, 1992; 
Trull, Widiger, & Guthrie, 1990; Tyrka, Haslam, & Cannon, 1995) and per-
sonality variables (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Strobe, 1989). Although all 
of these studies have tested for categories of people, taxometric analysis has 
also been used in a study of types of social relationship (Haslam, 1994). In 
a similar extension of taxometric analysis away from person types, it has re-
cently been proposed as a valuable strategy for research on basic emotions 
and emotion families by Ekman and Davidson (1994). The present study 
represents the fi rst foray of taxometric analysis into the study of emotion, 
and sought to illustrate the analysis for emotion researchers by answering 
the substantive question of the discreteness of envy and jealousy. 
Taxometric methods test for the presence of latent categories or “taxa” 
in large samples, where each case is measured on one occasion. The most 
commonly employed taxometric procedure is the maximum covariance 
(or MAXCOV) method (Meehl & Golden, 1982). The MAXCOV meth-
od uses multiple “indicator” variables that are hypothesized to discrimi-
nate a latent category. From this set of N indicators all possible scales of 
N–2 indicators are then constructed, and the remaining two items are co-
varied among subsamples of cases along the scale (i.e., very low scorers, 
low scorers, intermediate scorers, and so on). Meehl and Golden showed 
that a function with maximum covariance in the intermediate range on 
the scale (strictly, at the point where there is maximum mixture of cate-
gory members and nonmembers) and near-zero covariance at each end-
point (i.e. among subsamples with category members or nonmembers 
preponderating) implies a discrete latent variable. This pattern follows 
because variables that discriminate between categorical alternatives will 
tend to covary more between categories than within categories. For ex-
ample, height and hair length are probabilistic indicators of biological 
sex among American adults, typically covarying in mixed groups. They 
do not strongly covary among women or among men, however, and will 
therefore covary maximally when an equal mixture of both is present. 
Such an equal mixture could be found by selecting cases from the inter-
mediate range on a personality scale of masculinity-femininity, at the ex-
tremes of which cases would be disproportionately men and women. 
Although the MAXCOV procedure has seen the most use in psycholo-
gy, a variety of alternative taxometric and latent class procedures exist for 
testing discreteness. One of the more prominent is “commingling analy-
sis” (MacLean, Morton, Elston, & Yee, 1976), which has been used most 
in behavioral genetics (e.g., Price & Stunkard, 1989). Rather than examin-
ing multiple indicator variables, like MAXCOV; commingling analysis ex-
amines single quantitative distributions, and tests whether observed distri-
butions  are best modeled by single- or multiple-component distributions. 
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If multiple components are suspected—typically on the strength of skew 
and/or kurtosis in the observed distribution—commingling algorithms de-
termine whether the fi t of multiple-component models is signifi cantly su-
perior to the fi t of single-component models, allowing statistically for the 
fact that adding components also adds degrees of freedom, and hence can-
not result in inferior fi t. If models containing multiple components show 
signifi cantly superior fi t, commingling analysis estimates their parameters. 
Commingling analysis of a mixed sample’s distribution of scores on a mas-
culinity-femininity scale, for example, would put a chi-square value to the 
superior fi t of two-component versus one-component models, and estimate 
the mixing proportions of men and women in the sample and the difference 
between the means of the two component distributions in sample standard 
deviation units. In sum, commingling analysis represents a distinct, distri-
bution-based form of analysis that complements the indicator-based MAX-
COV procedure, and enables a convergent assessment of its fi ndings. 
The present study hoped to exploit the opportunities that the two forms 
of analysis provide for testing between discrete and continuous models of 
envy and jealousy. If the emotions prove to be discrete, the study sought 
to test how well subjects’ usage of the two emotion terms corresponded to 
the two categories. The discreteness of the emotions themselves does not 
guarantee that people discriminate them in a corresponding manner, and 
it is possible that people’s emotion concepts, and consequently their use 
of emotion terms, are systematically discrepant. Indeed, there is evidence 
that the usage of the two terms is somewhat ambiguous (Parrott & Smith, 
1993), and it is important to ask why this might be. The ambiguity could 
result from an imperfect mapping between the terms and the emotion cat-
egories, from cooccurrence of the emotion categories, from the emotions 
intergrading continuously, rather than being categories, from the emotion 
concepts being indistinct, or from some combination of these alternatives. 
Empirical analyses of discreteness, cooccurrence, and emotion labeling 
can help in assessing these alternatives. 
In summary, the present study attempted to accomplish three goals: 
(1) to replicate Parrott and Smith’s (1993) fi nding of distinctive features 
of envy and jealousy; (2) to examine taxometrically whether these features 
compose discrete categories; and (3) to examine how the terms envy and 
jealousy map onto the respective categories or dimensions. To these ends, 
the study generated a sample of fi rst-person emotion episodes using an in-
struction that might equally elicit envy or jealousy but did not explicitly 
solicit either. Subjects rated these episodes on two sets of features that Par-
rott and Smith found to be distinctive to the two emotions, and also rated 
how “envious” and “jealous” they felt. Parrott and Smith’s fi nding of qual-
itative differences between envy and jealousy would be replicated if the 
260 HASLAM & BORNSTEIN IN MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 20 (1996)
two feature sets each covaried systematically. If, in addition, both feature 
sets yielded taxometric categories (i.e., if episodes high in envy were cat-
egorically distinct from those in envy, and episodes high in jealousy were 
categorically distinct from those low in jealousy), then envy and jealousy 
would represent discrete emotions. That is, for envy and jealousy to be cat-
egorically different from one another, both must be categories with distinc-
tive features, capable of being independently present or absent.3
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 291 undergraduates at Louisiana State University, who 
received extra credit for their participation. [Meehl and Golden (1982) re-
ported that samples in the vicinity of 300 are generally ample for the use 
of taxometric procedures.] The sample included 221 women and 70 men, 
and the mean age was 19.8 years. Despite the large sample size, there were 
no sex differences on the 21 study items, except that women rated two 
items—”feeling threatened” and “guilt over feeling ill will”—higher at the 
.05 level. In view of the scarcity and small magnitude of these differenc-
es, and the absence of sex differences on the overall principal-component 
scores [t(289) = 0.125 and 0.378, ps > .70], the results will be reported for 
the entire sample. 
Materials
A two-part questionnaire form was constructed, in which subjects were 
required to describe a personal emotion episode in Part 1 and then to rate 
it on a series of 21 items in Part 2. Eighteen of the items were drawn from 
Parrott and Smith (1993). 
Part 1 sought to elicit episodes that could equally fi t standard descrip-
tions of envy and jealousy, by explicitly mentioning neither term and us-
ing characteristics that they share.4 To this end, features determined by 
Parrott and Smith (1993) to be equally characteristic of envy and jeal-
3 If envy and jealousy were mutually exclusive, and their episodes can be placed on the ends of a 
single bipolar scale, then their individual discreteness would imply their discreteness from one an-
other. However, as the emotions are not exclusive, and have distinct unipolar factors underlying 
them (Parrott & Smith, 19930, the discreteness of one from the other can only be inferred from the 
discreteness of each individually. 
4 If the terms envy and jealousy were used to solicit the emotion episodes, then spurious discontinu-
ities could be produced by subjects selecting episodes from distinct regions within what is actually 
a latently continuous space. The assessment of the discreteness of the emotions would therefore be 
confounded by the discreteness of the emotion terms. 
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ousy were combined with other common attributes drawn from Ortony 
et al. (1988) into the following instruction: “Please attempt to recall a 
time, as recently as possible, when you felt resentful, hostile or angry to-
wards a ‘rival’ who seemed to be benefi tting from some desirable event, 
and when you also felt hurt, insecure and unfairly treated by life.” By 
incorporating the shared features of envy and jealousy, this instruction 
was suffi ciently ambiguous to elicit either emotion, but not so ambiguous 
that it should elicit emotions markedly different from them. Other relat-
ed emotions might be elicited by the instruction, and the study sought to 
determine whether envy and jealousy differed in kind from them. A brief 
narrative description of the episode was then solicited. Although these 
descriptions were made retrospectively, and hence may have been biased 
by expectations mediated by emotion concepts, we hoped to minimize 
such bias by sampling relatively recent emotion episodes and by exclud-
ing the terms envy and jealousy from the instructions. 
Part 2 of the questionnaire contained a randomly ordered list of 18 
items describing proposed discriminating features of envy and jealousy 
(nine items each), followed by three single items concerning self-rated 
envy, jealousy, and emotional intensity. Subjects were instructed to rate 
the emotional episode on all 21 items using 9-point Likert scales. All of 
the 18 envy and jealousy items were selected from Parrott and Smith’s 
(1993) item sample using the following considerations: 91) Each item 
should empirically discriminate between envy and jealousy episodes in 
their fi rst study, (2) each item should signifi cantly load on the appropriate 
envy or jealousy component in their principal components analysis, and 
(3) items for each emotion should be drawn from different features clus-
ters as much as possible, so as to minimize semantic redundancy. Conse-
quently, the envy and jealousy item sets each contained items that were 
hypothesized to represent distinguishing, factorially pure, and nonredun-
dant indicators of their respective emotions. 
Procedure
Subjects completed the questionnaire forms in groups of 3 to 12 in a 
laboratory space, under the supervision of a research assistant. Completion 
typically took approximately 15 min, after which subjects were debriefed. 
RESULTS
The mean ratings of the 291 emotion episodes on the 9-point self-re-
ported Envy and Jealousy scales (from 1, not at all characteristic, to 9, 
very characteristic) were 5.51 (SD = 3.06) and 5.64 (SD = 3.11), respec-
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tively, implying that many instances of both emotions were obtained. The 
mean rating on the 9-point intensity scale (from 1, not at all intense, to 9, 
extremely intense) was 6.94 (SD = 1.71), suggesting that these instances 
tended to be strong. 
Principal-Components Analysis
Prior to performing the MAXCOV and commingling analyses, a 
principal-components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on 
the 18 envy and jealousy items in order to replicate Parrott and Smith’s 
(1993) fi nding of distinct, orthogonal envy and jealousy components and 
to test whether the items loaded as hypothesized on the respective com-
ponents. Any item that failed to load uniquely on its component would 
be a poor indicator of its emotion and would therefore be excluded from 
the MAXCOV analysis, in the same way that any personality scale item 
that failed to load appropriately on the factor underlying the scale would 
be a poor indicator of the latent variable that the scale measures. In ad-
dition to replicating Parrott and Smith and winnowing the MAXCOV 
indicators, the principal-components analysis was performed to gener-
ate quantitative distributions of component scores for the commingling 
analyses, given that the components should discriminate their respective 
emotions. A two-component solution was recommended by scree test, 
and accounted for 40.4% of the variance in the item intercorrelation ma-
trix. The component loadings of the 18 items are presented in Table I, 
along with the correlations of the three additional items with the respec-
tive component scores. 
Table I strongly supports the existence of distinct envy and jealou-
sy components, replicating Parrott and Smith’s (1993) results to a strik-
ing degree. Eight of the nine hypothesized envy items loaded signifi cant-
ly (by convention > .30) on Component 1 and only one on Component 
2, and eight of the nine hypothesized jealousy items loaded signifi cant-
ly on Component 2 and only three on Component 1. Feeling privately 
ashamed, like a failure and dissatisfi ed with oneself (E4, E8, and E9), ap-
pear to have been particularly distinctive (i.e., factorially pure) features 
of envy, while feeling betrayed, rejected, and distrustful (J1, J4, and J8) 
were particularly distinctive features of jealousy. One hypothesized envy 
item (E7–feeling degraded) was a better indicator of the jealousy compo-
nent, and one hypothesized jealousy item (J6–feeling worried) is a bet-
ter indicator of the envy component. Two further hypothesized jealousy 
items (J2–being afraid of a possible loss, and J5–feeling uncertain) load-
ed signifi cantly on both components, and another (J3–feeling lonely) was 
factorially impure. 
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Consistent with the observation (Schoeck, 1969; Smith, Kim, & Par-
rott, 1988) that in everyday usage jealousy has expanded into envy’s tra-
ditional semantic territory, self-rated jealousy correlated as strongly with 
component 1 as self-rated envy. Interestingly, however, neither item corre-
lated substantially with Component 2 (although self-rated jealousy narrow-
ly reached signifi cance), suggesting that, for this sample at least, episodes 
traditionally understood to involve jealousy were not discriminatively la-
beled as such. Apparently in moving into envy’s semantic domain, jealou-
sy to some degree abandoned its own. The two terms were used as virtu-
al synonyms, in the sense of having a nearly identical reference, their items 
correlating .80 with one another (p < .0001). 
It is possible that the correlation of the two terms was artifactually high 
because the respective items were adjacent and in the same order (envy 
then jealousy) for all subjects, so that subjects might have anchored their 
jealousy ratings on their prior envy ratings. However, for this artifact to oc-
cur, subjects would have had to have very indistinct envy and jealousy con-
cepts to enable the anchoring to take place at all. Moreover, such anchoring 
would have had to be so overwhelmingly strong as to make the correlation 
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of jealousy with its component effectively zero, a result that could only oc-
cur if almost every subject anchored almost completely. It seems unlike-
ly, then, that an artifactual explanation can account fully for the fi ndings. 
However, it must be emphasized that the “synonymy” was obtained in an 
artifi cial task and for personal emotion episodes, and therefore can only be 
extended with caution to everyday emotion attribution and labeling. 
In summary, the principal-components analysis indicated that distinct 
affective syndromes corresponding closely to traditional conceptions of 
envy and jealousy and to Parrott and Smith’s (1993) factor structure per-
sisted, and had further corollaries in emotional experience. For instance, 
the greater correlation of emotional intensity with Component 2 replicat-
ed earlier work indicating that jealousy is typically a stronger emotion 
than envy (Salovey & Rodin, 1986; Smith et al., 1988). Nevertheless, the 
two affective  syndromes were not distinctively labeled by their respective 
emotion terms. 
MAXCOV Analyses
Prior to performing the MAXCOV analyses, it was necessary to select 
envy and jealousy items from the original set of 18 items that seemed to be 
good indicators of their respective emotions. Items that load weakly or not 
at all on their component probably measure another latent variable or con-
tain substantial error, and items that load on both components contaminate 
the assessment of one with the other, so items with high and pure loadings 
are preferable. By analogy, if we wanted to test for a hypothesized catego-
ry of introverts, we would want items that have been shown to correlate 
strongly with introversion, and which do not, like an item measuring social 
anxiety, also correlate with neuroticism. 
Based on these considerations, six hypothesized envy items (E1, E2, 
E4, E5, E8, and E9) and fi ve hypothesized jealousy items (J1, J4, J7, J8, 
and J9) were chosen as relatively pure and strong indicators of their com-
ponents. The mean loadings of the envy items on the envy and jealousy 
components were +.70 and +.02, respectively, whereas the mean loadings 
of the jealousy items were –.02 and + .65. Therefore the item sets were 
highly distinctive to the two components, although the high loadings of the 
selected items, on the basis of which they were selected, would be expect-
ed to shrink somewhat on retesting (i.e., cross-validation). 
Additive scales of all combinations of N – 2 items (i.e., 15 four-item 
scales from the six envy items and 10 three-item scales from the fi ve jeal-
ousy items) were constructed, and the two remaining items were covar-
ied at decile ranges along their corresponding scales (e.g., E1 and E2 were 
covaried for the 10% of subjects scoring lowest on the scale of E4 + E5 + 
E8 + E9, then for the next lowest 10%, and so on). The covariances of the 
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envy and jealousy items, averaged over the 15 and 10 scales, respectively, 
and smoothed by running means are presented in Fig. 1. 
Figure 1 displays clear elevations at intermediate ranges on the two 
covariance functions, consistent with the existence of discontinuity. Both 
emotions, that is, appear to be discrete kinds. The peak elevations on both 
functions are displaced somewhat to the left, indicating that the point of 
maximum mixture of category members and nonmembers was below the 
median of cases on the indicators. This fi nding implies in turn that the base 
rates of the two emotions (i.e., the proportions of the episode sample be-
longing to each emotion category) were greater than 50%. Using a proce-
dure described by Meehl and Golden (1982), these functions yielded base 
rate estimates of 71% for envy and 66% for jealousy. It is important to note 
that these estimates refer only to the proportions of emotion episodes with-
in the sample, not to the proportions of such emotional events in the sub-
jects’ or the general population’s lives outside of the study, or to propor-
tions of types of people prone to the respective emotions. 
The results of the MAXCOV analyses indicate that membership in the 
envy and jealousy categories was in an important sense not a matter of de-
gree. This is not to say that some instances of jealousy, for instance, were 
not “better,” more intense, or more prototypical than others. Better instanc-
Fig. 1. Covariance plot for the envy (solid line) and jealousy 
(dotted line) indicators
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es would tend to have more or more elevated features of jealousy (i.e., fall 
in the higher deciles on the jealousy function) than worse instances, but 
discreteness implies that even these worse instances would be located in-
side the determinate boundaries of the jealousy category. 
Commingling Analyses
Although the indicator-based MAXCOV analyses supported the dis-
creteness of envy and jealousy, convergent evidence was sought from an 
alternative, distribution-based form of taxometric analysis. The SKU-
MIX program (MacLean et al., 1976) was used to implement a commin-
gling analysis of the scores derived from the principal-components anal-
ysis. These scores represented the position of the emotion episodes on 
the two components, based on weighted sums of all 18 envy and jealou-
sy items. If the two emotions were discrete, then the observed distributions 
of scores on the two components should each contain two latent distribu-
tions, a relatively high scoring distribution of emotion members and a rel-
atively low scoring distribution of nonmembers. If, on the other hand, the 
emotions were dimensional, a single latent distribution should model the 
observed distributions satisfactorily. The commingling analyses therefore 
tested whether these observed distributions were modeled better by one or 
two latent distributions.5
Superfi cial inspection of the distributions of component scores sug-
gested the possibility of more than one latent distribution. Both distribu-
tions were slightly negatively skewed and signifi cantly (p < .01) platykur-
tic (short-tailed), as would be expected if two overlapping distributions 
were combined, with the high-scoring distribution being larger. In order 
to assess this possibility, four models of each component score distribu-
tion were tested, in each of which some parameters were fi xed and others 
free to vary. Parameters were the overall mean of the distribution (u); the 
variance of the distributions (V), constrained to be equal for two-distribu-
tion models; skewness (p), similarly constrained to equality for two-distri-
bution models; displacement (t), the separation in standard deviation units 
of latent distribution means; and mixing proportion (q), the base rate of the 
upper distribution. The four models were as follows: 
1. One normal distribution [u and V free, p fi xed to 1 (no skew), t and 
q fi xed to zero] 
2. One skewed distribution (u, V, and p free, t and q fi xed to zero) 
3. Two normal distributions (u, V, t, and q free, p fi xed to 1) 
4. Two skewed distributions (u, V, p, t, and q free) 
5 Commingling analysis can test three distribution models, but these were not relevant to the re-
search question of discreteness versus continuity. 
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The SKUMIX program provided a measure of goodness of fi t for each 
model expressed as –2 ln L (minus twice the natural logarithm of the likeli-
hood). The difference in this quantity between two models is distributed as 
chi square with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in number of free 
parameters. Results for the four models are presented in Tables II and III. 
Tables II and III present very similar patterns of fi ndings. In both cases, 
relaxing the skewness parameter p did not signifi cantly improve the fi t of 
either the one- or two-distribution models [Models 2 vs. 1 and 4 vs. 3, re-
spectively; χ2(l) = 0.09 – 1.52, n.s.]. Consequently the unskewed models (1 
and 3) provided satisfactory estimates of the fi t of one- and two-distribu-
tion solutions. Comparison of these two models revealed the clear superior-
ity of the two-distribution solution for envy [χ2(2) = 25.79, p < .0001 ] and 
for jealousy [χ2(2) = 9.14, p < .01]. The commingling analyses therefore 
replicated the MAXCOV fi ndings of discreteness. According to the param-
eter estimates derived from Model 3, discrete envy and jealousy catego-
ries existed with base rates (parameter q) of 75% and 76% in the sample of 
emotion episodes. These estimates were reasonably close to those derived 
from the MAXCOV analyses (71% and 66%, respectively). Given that the 
principal-component scores were uncorrelated, these estimates imply that 
Table II. Parameter Estimates and Goodness-of-Fit Values for the Commingling Analyses of 
the Envy Component (u = Grand Mean, V = Variance of distributions, p = Skewness, t = Sep-
aration of distribution means, q = Upper Distribution Base Rate, –2 ln L = Fit Statistic; Fixed 
Parameters in Parentheses) 
Table III. Parameter Estimates and Goodness-of-Fit Values for the Commingling Analyses of the 
Jealousy Component (u = Grand Mean, V = Variance of Distributions, p = Skewness, t = Separa-
tion of Distribution Means, q = Upper Distribution Base Rate, –2 ln L = Fit Statistic; Fixed Pa-
rameters in Parentheses) 
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57% (.75 * .76) of the sample of emotion episodes represented cooccur-
rences of envy and jealousy, consistent with Parrott and Smith’s (1993) 
claim that cooccurrence is common. Similarly, the base rate estimates sug-
gest that only 6% (.25 * .24) of the sample exemplifi ed neither emotion, 
implying that the instruction was successful in eliciting the two emotions. 
As the principal-components analysis was constrained to produce orthogo-
nal components, these cooccurrence and nonoccurrence estimates may be 
somewhat inaccurate. However, supplementary analyses using oblique ro-
tation indicated that the correlation of the two components was effectively 
zero, suggesting that the 6% fi gure was reasonably accurate. 
DISCUSSION
The fi ndings of the present study indicate that envy and jealousy can 
be differentiated. The evidence of the principal-components analysis strik-
ingly replicated Parrott and Smith’s (1993) fi ndings concerning distinc-
tive features. In addition, two convergent analyses indicated that the dis-
tinctive features of the two emotions compose discrete, bounded categories 
that correspond closely to traditional defi nitions. envy is characterized by 
feelings of shame, failure, dissatisfaction with self, and longing for what 
another had, whereas jealousy is characterized by feelings of betrayal, dis-
trust, rejection, threat and loneliness. Envy and jealousy appear to be com-
plex affective kinds that are distinct but often combined elements of the 
emotional repertoire. They do not appear to be conventionally designated 
regions in a continuous affective domain. 
Although the present study demonstrated discrete categories of emo-
tional experience corresponding to traditional descriptions of envy and 
jealousy, it also indicated that these categories do not directly correspond 
to the everyday usage of the respective terms. Envy and jealousy were used 
almost synonymously—although a methodological artifact may have con-
tributed to this—and referred preferentially to the envy category. These re-
sults replicated the robust fi nding of a historical expansion in the refer-
ence of jealousy to encompass envy (e.g., Schoeck, 1969), but suggest that 
in this sample at least a further shift may have occurred. Rather than envy 
covering only a subset of jealousy’s referential range, both terms now ap-
pear to have taken root in the envy category. 
It remains to be explained why jealousy, having expanded its range to 
refer to a new category, should withdraw from the category in which it was 
originally anchored. It may be that the fi rst shift has proceeded to the point 
where jealousy’s dominant usage is now in reference to traditional envy, 
and that distinct secondary usages, such as jealousy referring to tradition-
al jealousy, have tended to erode. Although this explanation is highly spec-
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ulative, a similar phenomenon is exemplifi ed by a historical shift in the 
meaning of anger. Originally referring to feelings of distress or affl iction, 
and derived from an Old Norse word meaning grief, it acquired the sense 
of rage in the 13th century (Ayto, 1991). This sense has subsequently be-
come dominant, and the previous senses have vanished. By this kind of ac-
count, there may now be a tendency for episodes of jealousy to be desig-
nated by other emotion terms, rather than by jealousy, because the latter 
now prototypically refers to something that differs in its feel, its situational 
determinants, and its moral implications (Sabini & Silver, 1982; Schoeck, 
1969). This claim could be tested by a study of the unconstrained label-
ing of naturally occurring emotion episodes, with the prediction that inde-
pendently rated envy episodes would be labeled jealousy more often than 
envy, and independently rated jealousy episodes would most commonly re-
ceive labels other than jealousy. 
Whatever the explanation of the variant senses of envy and jealousy, 
the present study cautions strongly against assuming any straightforward 
relationship between emotion terms and emotions themselves (cf. Ortony 
et al., 1988). The usage of emotion terms may be susceptible to historical 
changes that largely spare their original affective referents. It is quite con-
ceivable that historical changes are expressed most directly in altered la-
beling practices, and that the designated experiences either lag behind in 
their alterations or remain substantially unchanged. Although the position 
that unanchored emotion labels drift over relatively changeless emotional 
kinds is consistent with theories of universal or basic emotions ( e.g., Ek-
man, 1992) and antithetical to most social constructionist theories (e.g., 
Harré, 1986), it can also be made consistent with a sophisticated, cultur-
ally informed theory. Greenwood (1994) has recently argued that emo-
tions are constituted by social forms of evaluation of actions and social re-
lations, rather than by discourse about emotions that explicitly entertains 
emotion labels. Such labels are not necessary for the sort of moral com-
mentary out of which cultural meaning is given to emotional life, and out 
of which it may be transformed. By this “realist” account, emotion labels 
play no direct causal role in the transformation of emotions. Although the 
present study cannot adjudicate between universalist and realist theories, 
it is important to note that its fi ndings concerning the apparently greater 
stability of emotions than their labels do not entail a nonsocial, universal-
ist interpretation. 
The present study’s fi nding of discreteness supports earlier work 
claiming the existence of category boundaries in the fi eld of emotion. 
Category boundaries had previously been demonstrated in the percep-
tion of emotion (Etcoff & Magee, 1992) and in its mental representation 
(Haslam, 1995), and it appears that the experience of emotion can now 
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be added. It might also  be that the situational determinants of emotions 
are discrete, a position that Roseman’s (1991) work on the appraisal di-
mensions of discrete emotions embodied. This position has been argued 
by Salovey and Rodin (1986) in relation to envy and jealousy, although 
the present study indicates that situational differences do not exhaust the 
distinctiveness of the two emotions. 
Indeed the discreteness of the two emotions might fl ow from the dis-
tinctness and specifi city of the situations of adaptive functions that call 
them into play. Discrete affective responses (R) are most likely to stem 
from discrete eliciting conditions (C), without the categorical presence of 
which the response is not triggered (i.e., if C then R; if not-C then not-
R). On the other hand, continuously variable responses are more likely to 
stem from more diffuse and graduated conditions (i.e., the more C or Cs 
are present, the more R is elicited). By this account, the discreteness of 
envy and jealousy suggests that they have discrete eliciting conditions or, 
alternatively, discrete adaptive functions that make particular situations 
capable of triggering them. Precisely what such conditions or functions 
might be remains to be determined. 
This study’s convergent evidence for category boundaries in emotion 
is also consistent with Wierzbicka’s (1992) claim that emotion concepts 
may be defi nable, although it does not entail it. As the present study sug-
gests, it is crucial in the affective domain to distinguish between emotion 
concepts and the emotions themselves. It is conceivable that emotion con-
cepts might be sharp and defi nable and yet impose arbitrary divisions on 
emotional phenomena that lack real discontinuities, just as it is conceivable 
that people mentally represent emotions such as jealousy as graded pro-
totype structures (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Sharpsteen, 1993) although the 
phenomena themselves are in some sense discrete. In this light, the com-
mon practice of invoking “fuzzy” boundaries begs the question of discrete-
ness because there are two senses of “fuzziness.” In one sense, fuzziness is 
an intrinsic property of categories, and in the other it is a matter of the con-
cept-mediated identifi ability of category members. 
In the second sense of fuzziness, a category is fuzzy because its mem-
bers and nonmembers overlap phenotypically and our concepts sometimes 
assign degrees of membership or prototypically to potential members. Such 
overlap may make it impossible to determine to which class potential mem-
bers belong, although discrete classes unquestionably exist. For example, 
our concepts of obesity may consist of probabilistic feature lists that enable 
graded typicality judgments about individual cases, although there appears 
to be a discrete class of obese people whose weight overlaps the distribu-
tion of its nonmembers (Price & Stunkard, 1989). In the fi rst sense of the 
term, however, fuzziness is intrinsic to categories. For example, the cate-
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gory of tall people does not correspond to a genotypically distinct popula-
tion, and people may therefore belong to it by degrees according to the ar-
bitrary conventions that our concepts impose on the height continuum. The 
present study argues that envy and jealousy are not fuzzy categories in this 
sense; rather, instances of both belong to discrete but phenotypically over-
lapping classes, making identifi cation of marginal cases very diffi cult. Peo-
ple’s concepts of envy and jealousy may be intrinsically fuzzy, assigning 
emotion episodes to the respective prototypes by degrees, but the catego-
ries that ground these concepts are not so. 
Although much remains to be done in accounting theoretically for the 
bases of discrete categories, demonstrating their existence is itself a signif-
icant step. First, by locating nature’s joints (Gangestad & Snyder 1985) it 
works against the confl ation of emotions that are in some ways alike, en-
abling scientifi c advances by unconfounding discrete phenomena. Second, 
it stimulates study of the undergirding of the category boundaries, such 
as necessary features or discrete cultural schemata, eliciting conditions or 
physiological mechanisms. Third, it places the phenomenon under investi-
gation on a more solid ontological footing. A latent discontinuity implies a 
singular, nonarbitrary class of instances having something in common and 
a determinate boundary, whereas a latent continuity implies instances that 
can only be linguistically marked by more or less arbitrary convention. In 
view of these advantages, the further investigation of categorical distinc-
tions in the fi eld of emotion is clearly warranted. 
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